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AND THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX
The tax treatment accorded intangible assets has been, and continues
to be, one of the most prolific problem areas under the federal income
tax law. At their inception the question arises whether expenditures
for the acquisition of intangibles are ordinary and necessary business
expenses.' During their existence there is uncertainty as to whether
depreciation or amortization is allowable.2 When the intangibles are
disposed of, their deductibility as a loss may be disputed.3
Perhaps the great confusion that has surrounded the treatment of
intangibles under the federal income tax law is because of their am-
biguous nature. Basically, intangible assets represent rights, privileges
and competitive advantages which accrue to a business enterprise through
ownership.' But accountants, lawyers and economists hold different
opinions as to how intangibles can best be characterized. ' One approach
to the description of intangibles emphasizes the lack of physical existence
or materiality, thus distinguishing them from tangible assets.6 They have
also been described as the properties of a business which others cannot
duplicate freely in the market place, being monopolistic in nature.' Other
unique traits accorded intangibles are their interdependence, their inability
to be freely assigned and their value realized, their attachment to a going
concern, and their close relationship to earning power.8
Whatever the exact nature of intangibles, it is clear that they differ
from tangibles in such a way as to give rise to different tax consequences.
For example, both tangible and intangible assets can theoretically be de-
preciated under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,' but attempts to
depreciate intangibles encounter stiffer resistance from the Commis-
1. INT. R SV. CODE OF 1954, § 162(a) ; Nicholas Co., 38 T.C. 348 (1962).
2. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 167(a) ; Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 36 T.C. 912
(1961), aff'd, 309 F.2d 279 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 935 (1963).
3. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 165(a) ; Metropolitan Laundry Co. v. United States,
100 F. Supp. 803 (N.D. Cal. 1951).
4. WixoN, AccOUNTANTS' HANDBOOK § 19.1 (1957).
5. See generally YANG, GOODWILL AND OTHER INTANGIBLES 3-20 (1927).
6. I(OHLER, DicrToNaRY FOR AcCOUNTANTS (1952).
7. Pine, Federal Income Taxation of Intangible Assets, 8 TAx L. REv. 231 (1953).
S. YANG,, op. cit. supra note 5.
9. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-2 (1956) ; Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (1956), as amended,
T.D. 6452, 1960-1 Cum. BuLL. 127.
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sioner than do efforts to depreciate tangibles. Tangible assets are con-
sidered readily depreciable because their economic usefulness gradually
lessens each year due to creeping obsolescence and physical exhaustion
that in most instances can be accurately measured.1" And even when a
claimed deduction for a tangible asset is based necessarily upon specula-
tion, some amount of depreciation will be permitted because physical wear
and tear provide a minimum deduction. Where intangibles are en-
countered, on the other hand, there is no basis for claiming physical wear
and tear. Thus, the useful life of an intangible must be reasonably
certain before any deduction is allowable, as with patents and copyrights
whose maximum life is limited by law," and contracts and covenants not
to compete whose lives are stipulated in a particular document.12 Items
such as good will, newspaper subscription lists, and customer routes are
denied depreciation on the theory that they have indefinite lives."
An area presently engendering a great deal of controversy is the tax
treatment accorded purchased executory contracts. Generally, the prob-
lem arises when a taxpayer purchases the outstanding stock or the assets
of a going concern,' 4 or when he issues stock in exchange for contracts. "
10. A relatively few tangible assets are denied amortization on the ground that
they suffer no loss of usefulness, e.g., land, radium, works of art and curios, and land
title abstract plants. 4 MERTENS, THE LAW OF FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION § 23.09
(1960).
11. American Chemical Paint Co. v. Commissioner, 66 F.2d 381 (3d Cir. 1933)
(patents) ; Taylor v. Commissioner, 51 F.2d 915 (3d Cir. 1931), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 689
(1932) (copyrights).
12. Wilson Athletic Goods Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 222 F.2d 355 (7th Cir. 1955)
(covenants not to compete) ; Bonwit Teller & Co. v. Commissioner, 53 F.2d 381 (2d Cir.
1931), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 690 (1932) (contracts) ; Flynn, Harrison & Conroy, Inc.,
21 B.T.A. 285 (1930), acq., X-1 Cum. BULL. 22 (1931) (contracts) ; Pennsylvania
Salt Mfg. Co., 18 B.T.A. 1148 (1930), acq., IX-2 CuM. BULL. 47 (1930) (contracts).
The intangibles that traditionally can be depreciated include leases, licenses,
franchises, patents, copyrights, trademarks, tradenames, trade secrets, subscription lists,
covenants not to compete, patents, and contracts. Note, An5 Inquiry into the Nature of
Goodwill, 53 COLUM. L. REv. 660 (1953).
13. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (1956), as amended, T.D. 6452, 1960-1 Cum. BULL.
127 (goodwill); Danville Press, Inc., 1 B.T.A. 1171 (1925) (newspaper subscription
lists) ; Pevely Dairy Co., 1 B.T.A. 385 (1925) (customer routes).
14. Indiana Broadcasting Corp., 41 T.C. no. 76 (1964) (stock purchase); North
Am. Serv. Co., 33 T.C. 677 (1960), vacated and remanded per stipulation, 61-1 U.S.
Tax Cas. 19353 (7th Cir. 1961), acq., 1960-2 Cum. BULL. 6 (stock purchase) ; Danville
Press, Inc., supra note 13 (purchase of assets).
15. Hickok Oil Corp. v. Commissioner, 120 F.2d 133 (6th Cir. 1941); Danco
Prods. Inc., 21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 287 (1962); Flynn, Harrison & Conroy, Inc., 21
B.T.A. 285 (1930), acq., X-1 Cum. BULL. 22 (1931); Bernicedale Coal Co., 16 B.T.A.
696 (1929), acq., X-1 Cum. BULL. 6 (1931); Powell Coal Co., 12 B.T.A. 492 (1928),
acq., VII-2 Cum. BULL. 32 (1928); Reserve Natural Gas Co., 12 B.T.A. 219 (1928),
acq., VII-2 Cum. BULL. 33 (1928).
Initially, the problem was limited to situations where assets were purchased or stock
was issued for the contracts. Where a stock acquisition was made and the corporation
was subsequently liquidated, no gain was recognized on the liquidation and the purchaser
acquired the assets at the basis of the purchased corporation. Since the executory
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The contracts that can be acquired in either instance cover varied sub-
ject matters including distributorships, agencies, employment, royalties,
leases, rights to service, purchases, sales subscriptions and network
affiliations."0 Sometimes, single executory contracts are purchased. Fre-
quently, a substantial number of such contracts are acquired in a single
purchase,'7 and in some cases the major portion of assets purchased in a
business consists of contracts."8 In several recent decisions courts have
denied either depreciation deductions during the lives of the purchased
executory contracts or loss deductions when the contracts were termi-
nated."0 This Note analyizes the principles at the basis of these decisions
and seeks to determine whether courts have been justified in their actions.
contracts entered by the purchased corporation did not have a cost basis, no problems
arose. The amount paid in excess of the basis was considered goodwill. McDonald,
Goodwill and the Federal Income Tax, 45 VA. L. REv. 645, 658 (1959). However, since
Kimbell-Diamond Milling Co. v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 74 (1950), aff'd per curiam,
187 F.2d 718 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 827 (1951), the same problem may arise
in stock acquisition situations. Under this decision, and its subsequent codification,
INTERNP L REvENUE CODE OF 1954, § 334(b) (2), a corporate taxpayer may purchase
the stock of a going corporation, liquidate it, and then allocate the purchase price among
the assets acquired, including the contracts, if any, at a stepped-up basis. This decision
acts as a catalyst by catapulting the contracts received in the liquidation into the same
problem area as purchased contracts. Indiana Broadcasting Corp., supra note 14;
North Am. Serv. Co., supra note 14.
16. Distributorships: Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 6 B.T.A. 1333 (1927) ; agencies:
Flynn, Harrison & Conroy, Inc., supra note 15; employment: Charles P. Limbert Co.,
9 B.T.A. 1390 (1928), acq., VII-2 Cum. BULL. 24 (192,3); royalties: Perine Mach. Co.,
22 B.T.A. 450 (1931), acq., X-2 Cum. BULL. 55, nonacq. on other grounds, X-2 Cum.
BULL. 98 (1931); Western Valve Bag Co., 13 B.T.A. 749 (1928); leases: Sam Scalish,
21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 260 (1962); Louis E. Smoot, 25 B.T.A. 1038 (1932), acq., XI-2
Cu i. BULL. 9 (1932) ; Boynton Gasoline Co., 6 B.T.A. 434 (1927), acq., VII-1 Cum.
BULL. 4 (1928); right to services: Kleeson Co., 6 B.T.A. 1153 (1927), aff'd, 28 F.2d
557 (4th Cir. 1928); purchases: Hickok Oil Corp. v. Commissioner, supra note 15;
Bernicedale Coal Co., supra note 15; Powell Coal Co., supra note 15; sales: United
States Industrial Alcohol Co. v. Helvering, 137 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1943), reversing on
other grounds 42 B.T.A. 1323 (1940) ; Kentucky Tobacco Prods. Co. v. Lucas, 5 F.2d
723 (W.D. Ky. 1925); Pennsylvania Salt Mfg. Co.. 18 B.T.A. 1148 (1930), acq., IX-2
Cum. BULL. 47 (1930) ; Reserve Natural Gas Co., supra note 15; subscriptions: Danville
Press, Inc., 1 B.T.A. 1171 (1925); network affiliations: Indiana Broadcasting Corp.,
41 T.C. no. 76 (1964) ; Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 36 T.C. 912 (1961), aff'd, 309
F.2d 279 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 935 (1963).
17. Where a large number of contracts are acquired, a distinct problem is presented
which will be considered more fully infra.
18. For example, in Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 36 T.C. 912 (1961), aff'd,
309 F.2d 279 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denzed, 372 U.S. 935 (1963), the taxpayer expended
$8,500,000 for the going concern of the seller. Of this amount, $5,000,000 was allocated
to a network affiliation contract and $730,000 to spot advertising contracts. The re-
mainder was divided among goodwill $1,500,000, and merely $1,300,000 was allocated
to the tangibles and receivables.
19. Danco Prods. Inc., 21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 287 (1962); Sam Scalish, 21 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 260 (1962); Richard M. Boe, 35 T.C. 720 (1961). aff'd, 307 F.2d 339
(9th Cir. 1962), Herbert %I IaRue, 37 T.C. 39 (1961), acq., 1962-2 Cum. BULL. 5;
Westinghouse Broadcasting Co. "upra note 18; Tlhrifticheck Serv. Corp., 33 T.C. 1038
(1960), aff'd, 287 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1961).
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I. SINGLE PURCHASED CONTRACTS
A. Depreciation
1. Deductibility
Taxpayers have been allowed to depreciate contracts since the early
days of the federal income tax. In Kentucky Tobacco Products Co. v.
Lucas2 0 a district court held that a supply contract of the taxpayer was
depreciable under the provision of the Revenue Act of 1918 that pre-
scribed a "reasonable allowance for exhaustion, wear and tear of property
used in the trade or business, including a reasonable allowance for obso-
lescence."'" The court held that no deduction would have been per-
missible under the Revenue Act of 1916, which did not contain the above
clause authorizing a deduction for obsolescence.22 The court was of the
opinion that under the earlier act exhaustion and wear and tear was
depreciable only when it was the product of use in the taxpayer's trade
or business, and that since the supply contract before them would have
been exhausted by the passage of time irrespective of its being employed
in the taxpayer's business, it was not depreciable.28 Whether or not the
court's construction of the earlier revenue act was sound, the case appears
as the foundation of authority for allowing the depreciation of contracts.
The problem that faces the taxpayer today is justifying a claimed deduc-
tion by establishing the basis and useful life of contracts.
a. Basis
The taxpayer must establish the basis of property as a prerequisite to
depreciation. The principal problem presented courts in the early con-
tract cases was how to ascertain depreciable basis.24 Taxpayers were per-
mitted to compute their depreciation allowance on contracts acquired on
20. 5 F.2d 723 (W.D. Ky. 1925).
21. Ch. 18, § 234(a), 40 Stat. 1077. Basically, the wording of the Revenue Act of
1918 has been carried forward to the present time. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 167(a).
22. The Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 234, § 12(b), 39 Stat. 769, provided a deduction
for "all losses actually sustained within the year in business or trade . . ., including
a reasonable allowance for the exhaustion, wear and tear of property arising out of its
use . . . in the trade or business."
23. However, in International Curtis Marine Turbine Co. v. United States, 63 Ct.
Cl. 597 (1927), decided after the Kentucky Tobacco Products case, the court permitted
depreciation of a contract for the production of royalty income under the Revenue Act
of 1916. The court reasoned that the contract was the basis of the income produced
and was being exhausted by use in the business.
24. Kentucky Tobacco Prods. Co. v. Lucas, 5 F.2d 723 (W.D. Ky. 1925); Com-
missoner v. Pittsburgh Union Stock Yard Co., 46 F.2d 646 (3d Cir. 1931), affirming
16 B.T.A. 139 (1929) ; Cook China Co., 1 B.T.A. 254 (1924) ; Reserve Natural Gas Co.,
12 B.T.A. 219 (1928), acq., VII-2 Cum. BULL. 33 (1928) ; Flynn, Harrison & Conroy,
Inc., 21 B.T.A. 285 (1930), acq., X-1 Cum. BULL. 22 (1931); Walter E. Kramer, 27
B.T.A. 1043 (1933), aff'd, 80 F.2d 1014 (1935).
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or before March 1, 1913 by using as a basis the fair market value of the
contracts as of the March 1 date." The basis for contracts acquired after
that date was cost"0 or, if the contracts were received by a corporate
taxpayer in exchange for stock, fair market value.27 Courts, obviously,
became involved in the problem of ascertaining a March 1, 1913 fair
market value for intangibles purchased previous to that date.28
Presently, the basis for depreciation of contracts is cost or whatever
other basis is used in determining gain or loss upon their disposal. 9
When a single contract is purchased there is no difficulty in determining
basis; it is simply cost. Complications arise where a group of assets
including one or more contracts is acquired for a single price, for under
such circumstances purchase price must be allocated between all of the
tangible and intangible assets." Failure to apportion consideration
among the purchased contracts may result in a disallowance of contract
depreciation as to any and all contracts for lack of an established basis."'
However, the parties to a purchase-sell agreement can generally avoid
such a consequence by specifying in their agreement the consideration
applicable to each asset and contract, as long as their determination is
realistic.2
25. See Kentucky Tobacco Products Co. v. Lucas, supra note 24.
26. National Weeklies, Inc., v. Commissioner, 137 F.2d 39 (8th Cir. 1943);
Wralter E. Kramer, 27 B.T.A. 1043 (1933), aff'd, 80 F.2d 1014 (7th Cir. 1935);
National Film Publicity Co., 4 B.T.A. 118 (1926), acq., V-2 Cum. BULL. 3 (1926).
27. Hickok Oil Corp. v. Commissioner, 120 F.2d 133 (6th Cir. 1941) ; Perine Mach.
Co., 22 B.T.A. 450 (1931), acq., X-2 Cum. BULL. 55, nonacq. on other grounds, X-2
Cum. BULL. 98 (1931); Flynn, Harrison & Conroy, Inc., 21 B.T.A. 285 (1930), acq.,
X-1 Cu . BULL. 22 (1931) ; Bernicedale Coal Co., 16 B.T.A. 696 (1929), acq., X-1
CUM. BULL. 6 (1931); Powell Coal Co., 12 B.T.A. 492 (1928), acq., VII-2 Cum. BULL.
32 (1928); Reserve Natural Gas Co., 12 B.T.A. 219 (1928), acq., VII-2 Cum. BULL.
33 (1928); Boynton Gasoline Co., B.T.A. 434 (1937), acq., VII-1 CuM. BULL. 4 (1928).
In these cases, there was no indication whether the shareholder recognized gain on the
exchange. Presently, the basis of property received by a corporation in exchange for its
stock is the basis in the hands of the transferor, increased by the gain recognized by
the transferor. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 362(a). Where the transfer is made to a
controlled corporation, no gain or loss is recognized by the transferor. INT. REV. CODE
OF 1954, § 351(a).
28. Initially, the Government took the position that the March 1, 1913 value of
leases and contracts could not be the basis for depreciation. T.D. 3414, 1-2 Cum. BULL.
90 (1922) ; A.R.R. 4803, 111-1 Cum. BULL. 173 (1924). Subsequently, this position was
amended. T.D. 3760, IV-2 Cum. BULL. 154 (1925).
29. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 167(f), 1011, 1012.
30. For a general discussion of the problem of allocation among intangibles see
Carson, Amortiing the Excess Cost of a Purchased Business. Allocation Problems,
N.Y.U. 7th Inst. on Fed. Tax 445 (1962).
31. Charles P. Limbert Co., 9 B.T.A. 1390 (1928), acq., VII-2 Cuii. BULL. 24
(1928); General Equip. Co., 2 B.T.A. 804 (1925).
32. Sidney V. Le Vine, 24 T.C. 147 (1955).
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b. Useful Life
A contract, to be depreciable, must also have a useful life that can
be determined with reasonable accuracy. 3 If the taxpayer cannot or does
not prove useful life with certainty, a deduction for depreciation will
be disallowed. 4 In the case of contracts, it is generally more difficult
for a taxpayer to establish a useful life than it is to arrive at an allowable
basis.
Of course it is not difficult, when depreciating contracts that termi-
nate at a definite and stated time, to establish that useful life is the term
specified in the contract. However, if the contract does not state its
duration, its useful economic life ordinarily is difficult to prove and
depreciation rarely will be allowed." The exhaustion which provides
the basis for depreciation is hardly susceptible of measurement or based
upon a lapse of time. 6 In such a case, a determination of the Commis-
sioner as to the useful life of an asset is presumptively correct,3" and
the taxpayer must carry the burden of proof to overcome the presumption
if he seeks to use a period of years other than that established by the
Commissioner.3"
An additional complicating factor in determining useful life is
presented by contracts which contain a provision for renewals. Initially
the courts held that a renewal provision indicated that a contract had a
life beyond its original term. 3 However, in Bonwit Teller & Co. v. Cot-
missioner0 it was determined that contract depreciation could be com-
puted upon the basis of the initial contract term without consideration
of any possible renewal period. The court reasoned that the renewal
33. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (1956), as amended, T.D. 6452, 1960-1 Cum.
BULL. 127.
34. Nachman v. Commissioner, 191 F.2d 934 (5th Cir. 1951), affirining 12 T.C.
1204 (1949), acq., 1949-2 Cum. BULL. 3; Western Valve Bag Co., 13 B.T.A. 749 (1928) ;
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 6 B.T.A. 1333 (1927); General Equip. Co., 2 B.T.A. 804 (1925).
35. 4 MERTENS, op. cit. supra note 10, at § 23.65. For an interesting and enlighten-
ing example of overcoming the Commissioner's presumption of correctness compare
Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 36 T.C. 912 (1961), aff'd., 309 F.2d 279 (3d Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 372 U.S. 935 (1963) (disallowed depreciation of network affiliation con-
tract), with Indiana Broadcasting Corp., 41 T.C. no. 76 (1964) (allowed depreciation
of network affiliation contract).
36. See General Equip. Co., 2 B.T.A. 804 (1925); Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 6
B.T.A. 1333 (1927).
37. Hoffman v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 784, 788 (3d Cir. 1962); T. H. Riddell,
15 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 379 (1956).
38. Spencer D. Lorton, 12 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 613 (1953); Stanley S. Moore,
12 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 925 (1953).39. Dallas Athletic Ass'n, 8 B.T.A. 1036 (1927); 719 Fifth Avenue Co., 5 B.T.A.
565 (1926), acq., VI-1 Cum. BULL. 5 (1927).
40. 53 F.2d 381 (2d Cir. 1931), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 690 (1932).
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period constituted a separate property interest and was not an asset
used in the business.
For a time subsequent to Bonwit Teller courts followed its decision
and rationale.4" Recently, however, the trend appears to have been re-
versed; courts have held that contracts with renewal provisions cannot
be limited to their original terms in a determination of their useful life.
In Westinghouse Broadcasting Co." the taxpayer acquired the assets of
a television broadcasting station which included a network affiliation
contract with a two year term and an automatic renewal clause if either
party failed to terminate within three months of the expiration date.
The Tax Court held that the taxpayer had failed to establish the useful
life of the network contract and could not depreciate it over the remainder
of the two year term. 3 The court distinguished the Bonwit Teller case
on the ground that there the lease required a redetermination of the
annual rental while the affiliation contract would include the same terms.
The court also refused to follow cases that ignored renewal provisions
in determining useful lives of contracts and statements that the probability
of renewal need not be considered in determining useful life.4
41. Helvering v. Kansas City Am. Ass'n Baseball Co., 75 F.2d 600 (8th Cir.
1935); Commissioner v. Pittsburgh Athletic Co., 72 F.2d 883 (3d Cir. 1934), affirming
27 B.T.A. 1074 (1933), acq., XIV-1 CuM. BULL. 16 (1935), revoking nonacq. XII-2
CUM. BULL. 24 (1933); 379 Madison Ave. Inc. v. Commissioner, 60 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.
1932).
42. 36 T.C. 912 (1961), aff'd, 309 F.2d 279 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S.
935 (1963).
43. Under the regulations promulgated by the Federal Communications Commis-
sion then in effect, network affiliation contracts were limited to a maximum period of
two years. 47 C.F.R. §3.658(c) (1958). These regulations have been upheld.
National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943). The Tax Court
suggested that because of the agency regulation the two year contract term may not
have been the term actually contemplated by the parties. 36 T.C. at 919. Prior to the
promulgation of the regulation, network affiliation contracts tied the broadcasting
stations to the network for five years. HEAD, BROADCASTING IN AMERICA 229-32 (1956).
The networks and the stations generally renewed these contracts to acquire stability in
anticipating income and costs, to avoid the risk of becoming affiliated with an un-
prosperous station and to prevent a competitor from making an affiliation. WARNER,
RADIO AND TmEVISION LAW 470 (1948).
44. 36 T.C. at 921.
Revenue Ruling 57-377, 1957-2 Cum. Bu.LL. 146, published prior to the decision in
Westinghouse, was based upon an identical fact situation and arrived at the same
result on a different theory. The Commissioner held that by reason of the network
contract the station could reasonably expect a substantial amount of revenue from the
network through its commercial sponsors, and, because of a long history of renewals
between the parties, the refusal to renew representing an exception in an industry of
long continued affiliations, a permanent arrangement was produced. Therefore, the con-
tract constituted goodwill and did not qualify for depreciation. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3
(1956), as amended, T.C. 6452, 1960-1 Cum. BuLL. 127. Under this theory the tax-
payer would never be able to depreciate the network contract since it constituted good-
will.
The ruling was severely criticized by one author because the Commissioner com-
pared the network contract to a seller-customer arrangement and also failed to con-
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It is suggested that the decision in Westinghouse, in view of the
facts before the court in that case, is the proper one when a taxpayer
purchases an executory contract with an automatic renewal provision. It
is naive to consider that he would pay a purchase price that greatly ex-
ceeded the prospective income during the executory period of the con-
tract unless he anticipated economic benefits beyond the original term.4"
Where the right to renewal is not vested, but is conditional upon the
mutual consent of the parties, the taxpayer acquires, in addition to the
benefits under the executory portion of the contract, the possibility of a
contract renewal.
If it is assumed that the renewal is a continuation of the initial net-
work contract, depreciation must be disallowed if it is not possible to
establish, with a reasonable degree of certainty, useful life over which
the contract may be depreciated. 6 In such a situation, the benefits
resulting from the acquired contract are not limited to the executory
period, but extend to future periods. For depreciation to be allowed,
any determination of useful life must be based upon a combination of the
executory portion and renewal periods over which the option will be
exercised.47 The burden is upon the taxpayer to prove the useful life
of the contract, and to satisfy his burden he must take into account the
history of renewals by the transferor of the taxpayer, the trend in the
industry, and general economic conditions.4s Failure to adduce the neces-
sider a definitely ascertainable life, namely, its stated duration. McDonald, supra note
15, at 674-80. It was suggested that, so long as a term was stated, a contract should
be depreciated over that term unless income is distorted, id. at 675, and the fact that a
contract is renewable and strong reason exists to anticipate a renewal should not be
sufficient to deny the allowance. Id. at 677. However, this conclusion is based upon
the earlier cases, rejected in Westinghouse, which had disregarded the renewal provi-
sions in the contracts. The earlier cases were Helvering v. Kansas City Am. Ass'n
Baseball Co., 75 F.2d 600 (8th Cir. 1935); Commissioner v. Pittsburgh Athletic Co.,
72 F.2d 883 (3d Cir. 1934), affirming 27 B.T.A. 1074 (1933), acq., XIV-1 Cuc. BULL.
16 (1935), revoking nonacq. XII-2 Cum. BULL. 24 (1933); Bonwit Teller & Co. v.
Commissioner, 53 F.2d 381 (2d Cir. 1931), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 690 (1932); Flynn,
Harrison & Conroy, Inc., 21 B.T.A. 285 (1930), acq., X-1 Cum. BULL. 22 (1931);
Pennsylvania Salt Mfg. Co., 18 B.T.A. 1148 (1930), acq., IX-2 Cumr. BULL. 47 (1930) ;
Bernicedale Coal Co., 16 B.T.A. 696 (1929), acq., X-1 Cum. BULL. 6 (1931). The
reasoning of those cases and the article failed to consider the actual benefits that the
taxpayer anticipated and the fundamentals of depreciation as to useful life.
45. For example, in the Westinghouse case the average earnings before taxes were
$1,700,000 for two years prior to the acquisition. Of the $8,500,000 purchase price, the
taxpayer allocated $5,000,000 to the network affiliation contract which had a remaining
term of only seven months.
46. Nachman v. Commissioner, 191 F.2d 934 (5th Cir. 1951), affirming 12 T.C.
1204 (1949), acq., 1949-2 Cum. BULL. 3; Western Valve Bag Co., 13 B.T.A. 749
(1928) ; Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 6 B.T.A. 1333 (1927) ; General Equip. Co., 2 B.T.A.
804 (1925).
47. Indiana Broadcasting Corp., 41 T.C. no.76 (1964).
48. Ibid.
NOTES
sary proof will result in a denial of a deduction.
If, on the other hand, it is assumed that the taxpayer has purchased
a network contract containing two separate benefits each of which con-
stitutes an asset, namely, the executory portion of the contract and the
probability of renewal, there may be two grounds for disallowing de-
preciation. First, the taxpayer may fail to carry the necessary burden
for establishing the useful life of that portion of the contract which
represents renewal benefits. The primary purpose of depreciation is to
permit a taxpayer to recover his investment in business assets by al-
locating the basis of the investment over its useful life and charging it
against the income produced. However, failure to establish the useful
life with a reasonable degree of certainty eliminates the income matching
function and, therefore, precludes any depreciation deduction.49 Sec-
ondly, the taxpayer may fail to establish the bases of the contracts and the
renewal benefits upon which depreciation can be calculated. Where group
assets are purchased for a single consideration, the burden is upon the
taxpayer to establish a basis for individual assets or a deduction is
denied. The same reasoning is applicable where there are two benefits
under the contract, i.e., benefits both under the executory portion of the
contract and under the renewal portion. If no basis can be established
for the executory portion and for the renewal portion of the contract,
no depreciation can be allowed even though the useful life of either
or both portions of the contract can be determined.
The recent Indiana Broadcasting Corp. case,"0 in which the Tax
Court reaffirmed WVestinghouse as to the necessity of including renewal
periods in a determination of useful life, demonstrates that the problem
of establishing a deduction in a renewal provision situation is not insuper-
able. There, the court permitted the taxpayer to depreciate the cost of two
network affiliation contracts over a twenty year period, which period
was in excess of the remainder of the stated contract term. The Com-
missioner contended that the contracts had an indeterminable useful life
because of the renewal provisions. However, based upon detailed industry
experience and an effective use of statistics derived from that experience,
the taxpayer satisfied the court that the network affiliation contracts
had a reasonably estimable useful life of twenty years."'
49. Nachman v. Commissioner, 191 F.2d 934 (5th Cir. 1951), affirming 12 T.C.
1204 (1949), acq., 1949-2 Cum. BuLL. 3; Western Valve Bag Co., 13 B.T.A. 749
(1928); Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 6 B.T.A. 1333 (1927); General Equip. Co., 2 B.T.A.
804 (1925).
50. 41 T.C. no.76 (1964).
51. Also, by its decision, the court rejected the position taken by the Commis-
sioner in Revenue Ruling 57-377, 1957-2 Curm. BULL. 146, that the network affiliation
contracts constituted goodwill. The Commissioner argued, as he alternatively did in
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
2. When Deductible.
If the depreciation of a contract is proper because the taxpayer is
able to establish basis and useful life, the deduction must be taken in the
year in which the exhaustion sought to be written off occurred. The
taxpayer cannot accumulate the depreciation and deduct it in a later
year.52 Failure to take the deduction in the proper year can result in its
loss if the period for the statute of limitations passes."8
The taxpayer who purchases a contract may find himself on the
horns of a dilemma in determining how to depreciate a contract since it
is not known whether the Commissioner will adhere to the Westinghouse
and Indiana Broadcasting cases. For example, if a taxpayer purchases a
broadcasting station and, relying on the result in Westinghouse or the
Commissioner's decision in Revenue Ruling 57-377,4 declines to depreci-
ate the network affiliation contract, upon the sale of the contract or a
subsequent attempt to depreciate its cost the Commissioner could contend
that the taxpayer should have previously depreciated the contract based
upon Indiana Broadcasting. Therefore, the taxpayer would be required
to reduce the basis used in determining gain or loss or depreciation for
subsequent years, and would have forfeited the previously allowable
deduction. On the other hand, the Commissioner may not acquiesce in the
Indiana Broadcasting decision, and the taxpayer may be required to
litigate the same issue presented in that case and in Westinghouse.
B. Losses
If a contract is not depreciable because it has an indeterminable life,
a business loss should be permitted in the year the contract is terminated
or cancelled. While no cases appear to have discussed this issue at length,
contract loss deductions have been allowed for the unamortized portion
of a cancelled contract, 5 for the investment in a contract calling for the
Westinghouse, that the contracts constituted a part of the seller's goodwill, and there-
fore could not be depreciated. In Westinghouse, the court was not required to con-
sider this issue since the failure to establish useful life was sufficient to control the
result. However, in Indiana Broadcasting, the determination was necessary because
of the favorable finding with respect to the taxpayer's establishing the contract's useful
life. This contention of the Commissioner was rejected, the court stating that the
contracts were not goodwill even though they provided the taxpayer with highly prized
programing for attracting a large audience-a large audience to attract sponsors and
cost savings in programing. The court also indicated that the contract failed to
provide the bulk of the taxpayer's income as would be the situation if goodwill were
acquired.
52. Atlantic Carton Corp., 2 B.T.A. 380 (1925); Even Realty Co., 1 B.T.A. 1230
(1925), acq., IV-2 Cum. BuLL. 2 (1925).
53. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6501.
54. See sutpra note 44.
55. Metro Picture Film Exchange, 1 B.T.A. 721 (1925), acq., VI-1 Cum. BuLL.
3 (1927).
NOTES
development of an invention if experiments have been terminated,56 and
for the basis of cancelled leases with indefinite lives."T Also, analogies
can be drawn to support the loss deduction in the case of contracts to
decisions which permit the charge off of customer routes and licenses
when these have become valueless. 8 The cancellation or termination of
a contract renders that intangible valueless in the same way as does the
loss of a license or a customer route.
A problem in determining an allowable loss deduction may arise
if the contract cannot be severed from the business' goodwill, a situation
suggested in Revenue Ruling 57-377.9 A deduction for loss of goodwill
can only be taken when the loss is evidenced by a completed and dosed
transaction, a principle which requires that the entire operations of the
taxpayer be terminated or the portion of the business to which the
goodwill is attached be sold."0 A mere decrease in value or a partial loss
of goodwill is not sufficient. Thus, if a contract cannot be severed from
goodwill, a loss deduction will be denied upon the termination or cancella-
tion of the contract on the ground that a partial loss of goodwill is all that
occurred. But the court in Westinghouse and the Commissioner in
Revenue Ruling 57-377 refused to consider this issue, and in Westing-
house it was an imminent problem since the network had served notice
upon the taxpayer that it would terminate the contract.6 In that case
the purchase price paid by the taxpayer for the television station approxi-
mately equaled the average annual earnings capitalized at the standard
yardstick used for measuring the value of a television station. The close
56. J. Weingarten, Inc., 44 B.T.A. 798 (1941), acq., 1941-2 Cum. BuLL. 13.
57. Henry C. Rowe, 19 B.T.A. 906 (1930), acq., X-1 Cum. BumL. 56 (1931).
However, in Van Landingham Western Sales, Inc., 35 B.T.A. 130 (1936), a loss de-
duction was denied in the year of cancellation of a renewable agency contract. The
taxpayer had not amortized the contract previously and the court held that under the
Bonwit Teller case a deduction must be taken over the life of the original term. The
rationale of this case probably has been overruled by the decision in Westinghouse.
58. Metropolitan Laundry Co. v. United States, 100 F. Supp. 803 (N.D. Cal.
1951) (customer route). McAvoy Co., 10 B.T.A. 1017 (1928), acq., 1947-2 Cum. BULL.
3, revohing nonacq. VII-2 Cum. BuLL. 47 (1928) (license); Elston Co. v. United
States, 86 Ct. Cl. 136, 21 F. Supp. 267 (1929) (license).
59. 1957-2 Cum. BuL. 146.
60. See generally 62 YALE L.J. 640 (1953) and cases discussed therein.
61. The termination of the contract by the network also presented problems in the
antitrust and administrative law areas. The network threatened to cancel the contract
of the taxpayer if it did not exchange the station which was subject to the contract for
another station plus cash. After the Federal Communication Commission approved
the exchange, the United States brought an action under the antitrust laws to enjoin it.
The action was defended upon the ground that the Federal Communications Commis-
sion had primary jurisdiction over the matter. The Supreme Court rejected this con-
tention and reversed the district court. United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 358
U.S. 334 (1959), reversing 158 F. Supp. 333 (E.D. Pa. 1958), discussed in 57 MicH.
L. Rr-v. 885 (1959). Subsequently, the network consented to divest itself of the station.
United States v. Radio Corp. of America, CCH 1959 Trade Cas. 69,459 (E.D. Pa.).
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relationship of the total purchase price to the value of the television
station as a going concern could possibly have supported a finding that
goodwill purchased from the predecessor. And, although the parties
allocated a portion of the consideration to the contract, that fact does not
bind the courts if the allocation is unrealistic.62 Under such circum-
stances, the termination of the contract would not have been a completed
and closed transaction affecting the loss of the entire goodwill but a mere
reduction in its value or a partial loss, and no deduction could have been
allowed.63
However, the decision in Indiana Broadcasting may shed some
light in this area.6" The court explicitly held that the network affiliation
contract did not constitute goodwill. If the network affiliation contract
is an asset distinct from goodwill and it is terminated, it would follow
that the transaction is closed and completed and that a business loss is
allowable. However, the court stated that the seller had only been in
operation for two years prior to the purchase and that the goodwill which
had been built up was adequately covered by an allocation in the purchase
contract. Had the seller been in existence for a longer period, it is
possible that the allocation would not have been sufficient and a part
of the network contract may have been one of the elements of goodwill.
II. MASS PURCHASED CONTRACTS
More complex problems than those considered above are presented
when a group of executory sales contracts, rather than a single contract,
is purchased for use in a business.65 In some recent cases where taxpayers
have attempted to depreciate such contracts deductions have been denied."
Also, some cases have denied a deduction for a business loss when the
individual contracts were terminated.6" These cases appear to be in con-
62. 4 MERTENS, op. cit. supra note 10, at § 23.67.
63. Id. at §§ 28.14, .15.
64. The taxpayer in Indiana Broadcasting terminated a network affiliation con-
tract during one of the years under consideration. However, no indication was made
as to its income tax consequences.
65. The aggregate of the contracts have been labelled "en masse" contracts. The
term "en masse' contracts appears to have been first used in the syllabus to Westing-
house Broadcasting Co., 36 T.C. 912 (1961).
66. Danco Prods. Inc., 21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 287 (1962); Sam Scalish, 21 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 260 (1962); Richard M. Boe, 35 T.C. 720 (1961), aff'd, 307 F.2d 339
(9th Cir. 1962); Herbert M. La Rue, 37 T.C. 39 (1961), acq., 1962-2 Cum. BULL. 5;
Thrifticheck Serv. Corp. v. Commissioner, 287 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1961), affirming 33
T.C. 1038 (1960) ; Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 36 T.C. 912 (1961), aff'd, 309 F.2d
279 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 935 (1963).
67. Thrifticheck Serv. Corp. v. Commissioner, supra note 66; Danco Prods. Inc.,
supra note 66; Sam Scalish, supra note 66.
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flict with earlier decisions and even some recent ones."8 As a result,
there is a good deal of confusion in this area.
A. Depreciation
1. Basis and Useful Life.
Courts have indicated that the principles which pertain to the
depreciation of single contracts cannot be applied in the same manner
to executory sales contracts which are acquired "en masse." 9  One
difficulty which always confronts a taxpayer who has acquired con-
tracts en masse is determining the basis of the individual contracts.
Generally, the parties to the purchase agreement merely apportion, if in
fact they go that far, a fraction of the consideration paid for the entire
going concern to all the contracts without an allocation among the
individual contracts."0 As a result, it usually appears as if the taxpayer
did not purchase numerous individual contracts but a conglomerate.
The failure to allocate a portion of the consideration to the individual
contracts makes it impossible to determine a basis to use in depreciating
them individually. A correlative problem engendered by a purchase of en
masse contracts is determining a reasonably certain useful life over which
the conglomerate may be depreciated. Uncertainty arises because of the
numerous contract terms within the mass. Where a single contract is
purchased, neither of these difficulties is presented since basis becomes
the amount of the expenditure7' and the useful life is generally the re-
maining term of the contract."2
When depreciating en masse contracts taxpayers have attempted
to use the total cost as a basis and a useful life based on an arbitrary
period, 3 the period over which income is anticipated, 4 or the re-
68. North Am. Serv. Co., 33 T.C. 677 (1960), vacated and remanded per stipula-
tion, 61-1 U.S. Tax Cas. ff9353 (7th Cir. 1961), acq., 1960-2 Cum. BULL. 6; Hickok
Oil Corp. v. Commissioner, 120 F.2d 133 (6th Cir. 1941) ; United Profit-Sharing Corp.
v. United States, 66 Ct. Cl. 171 (1928).
69. See, e.g., Thrifticheck Serv. Corp., 33 T.C. 1038, 1046 (1960), aff'd, 287 F.2d
1 (2d Cir. 1961).
70. Danco Prods. Inc., 21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 287 (1962) ; Sam Scalish, 21 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 260 (1962); Richard M. Boe, 35 T.C. 720 (1961), affd, 307 F.2d 339
(9th Cir. 1962); Thrifticheck Serv. Corp., supra note 69; Westinghouse Broadcasting
Co., 36 T.C. 912 (1961), affd, 309 F.2d 279 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 935
(1963).
71. Pennsylvania Salt Mfg. Co., 18 B.T.A. 1148 (1930), acq., IX-2 Cum. BULL.
47 (1930); Reserve Natural Gas Co., 12 B.T.A. 219 (1928), acq., VII-2 Cum. BULL.
33 (1928); Cook China Co., 1 B.T.A. 254 (1924).
72. Flynn, Harrison & Conroy, Inc., 21 B.T.A. 285 (1930), acq., X-1 Cum. BULL.
22 (1931); General Equip. Co., 2 B.T.A. 804 (1925).
73. Sam Scalish, 21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 260 (1962) (30 months).
74. The court in Danville Press, Inc., 1 B.T.A. 1171 (1925) rejected this method
of calculating the deduction because the deduction for the year in issue bore no rela-
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maining terms of the individual contracts.75 Where a taxpayer takes
into account only the income period and gives no consideration to the
remaining terms of the individual contracts it is doubtful whether the
useful life concept is in fact being used to calculate depreciation. Like-
wise, where no basis is assigned to individual contracts, the accuracy
of any amount of depreciation claimed in any one period is questionable.
The result of these deficiencies is that the depreciation expense does not
bear a rational relationship to the exhaustion of the contract rights
which were acquired. Also, there may be no correlation between the
depreciation deduction and the income produced by the individual con-
tracts.7 It is true that in certain industries, e.g., life insurance, the
reasonably anticipated life of contracts, including their potential renewals,
can be predicted with great accuracy. Because of "front-load" charges-
costs of administration that the contract requires be absorbed by the
promisors in the initial stages of the arrangement-life insurance policies
tend to be renewed by their owners. Standardized life expectancy tables,7
the essential tools of the industry, can be used in conjunction with
lapse rate computations to predict the number of policy renewals in
future periods." No problem of an indefinite expectation of continued
business is presented because the maximum useful lives of the contracts
are limited by the deaths of the insureds. However, the mechanical
difficulties of establishing a proper basis and an accurate useful life for
contracts purchased en masse are present for the vast majority of
industries.
It is possible to avoid the objections to the methods that have been
tionship to the total income anticipated under the contracts. However, in another
case where expenditures had to be made to enter executory contracts, depreciation
based upon anticipated income of the individual contracts was devised by the court as a
method of properly calculating the deduction. United Profit-Sharing Corp. v. United
States, 66 Ct. Cl. 171 (1928).
75. United States Industrial Alcohol Co. v. Helvering, 137 F.2d 511 (2d Cir.
1943), reversing on other grounds 42 B.T.A. 1323 (1940) ; Westinghouse Broadcasting
Co., 36 T.C. 912 (1961), aff'd, 309 F.2d 279 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 935
(1963) ; Danville Press, Inc., supra note 74. However, in these cases the remaining
contract terms were one year or less, and the deduction may have distorted income.
76. The combined problems of basis and useful life are similar to the situation
where a group of tangible assets are acquired for a stated consideration. Under such
circumstances, the taxpayer is required to allocate the consideration paid among the
individual assets so that their basis may be determined.
77. For purposes of gift and estate taxes, the Commissioner has promulgated
regulations based upon life expectancy tables. Treas. Reg. §§ 25.2512-5(f), 20.2031-
7(f). Therefore, the Commissioner should not be able to effectively argue against the
tables' accuracy, within the reasonable requirements of the tax laws, when a sufficiently
large number of insurance contracts are involved.
78. For example see the use of "Evans Valuation Tables" in James F. Oates, 18
T.C. 570, 576 (1952), aff'd, 207 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1953), acq., 1960-5 Cum. BuLL. 8,
revoking nonacq. 1952-2 Cum. BULL. 5.
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employed by most taxpayers to depreciate en masse contracts in two ways.
One method is to have the parties specify in their purchase agreement
the amount of the consideration which is allocable to each contract.
The mere fact that the parties bargained for the contracts on an individual
basis, as long as the agreement did not specify their purchase price,
would not be sufficient to allow a basis to be attributed to the individual
contracts.7" If the purchase price is allocated among the individual con-
tracts and each contract was depreciated over its individual remaining
term, some of the difficulties can be eliminated. This method is still a
sound way of arriving at an allowable deduction.
Another method has been to allocate as much consideration as is
reasonable, without becoming absurd, to the tangible assets obtained in
the acquisition of the whole going concern. This practice alleviates
nearly all of the problems relating to contracts and other intangibles.
Iowever, the device will be of limited use in the future because of the
enactment of section 1245 of the Code in the Revenue Act of 1962.
This section provides in substance that any gain on the sale or other
disposition of certain assets as a result of excessive depreciation taken
after December 31, 1961 is ordinary income and not a capital gain. Be-
cause gain is taxed at ordinary rates, sellers may object to tis apportion-
ment in the purchase contract and will probably demand that a greater
portion of the consideration be allocated to the contracts and other
intangibles which could not be depreciated by the seller."
2. Creation of a New Asset: Customer Structure
Although the mechanical problems relating to en masse contracts
may be eliminated by the skillful use of drafting devices and more
detailed accounting practices, substantive difficulties may remain. The
79. Thrifticheck Serv. Corp., 33 T.C. 1038 (1960), aff'd, 287 F.2d 1 (2d Cir.
1961).
80. This probable dispute is comparable to the one presently existing where the
interests of the purchaser and seller conflict as to the amount to allocate to a covenant
not to compete. See generally McCandless, Tax Consequences of Covenant Not to
Compete, N.Y.U. 8th Inst. on Fed. Tax 880 (1950). In that situation, the seller is
burdened with adverse tax consequences if an amount is allocated to the covenant
because that portion of the consideration is taxed at ordinary income rates. Hamlin's
Trust v. Commissioner, 209 F.2d 761 (10th Cir. 1954) ; Beals' Estate v. Commissioner,
82 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1936). However, the buyer is permitted to depreciate the coven-
ant. Wilson Athletic Goods Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 222 F.2d 335 (7th Cir. 1955).
If there is no allocation, the consideration in excess of the value of the tangible assets
is classified as goodwill and the seller realizes a capital gain, George H. Payne, 22
T.C. 526 (1954), acq., 1954-2 Cum. BuLL. 5; Toledo Newspaper Co., 2 T.C. 794 (1943),
acq., 1944 Cum. BULL. 28, while the buyer is denied depreciation since goodwill is not
a depreciable asset. Harold J. Burke, 18 T.C.. 77 (1952) ; Toledo Blade Co., 11 T.C.
1079 (1948), aff'd mere., 180 F.2d 357 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 811 (1950),
acq., 1949-2 Cum. BuLL. 3.
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difference between single and en masse purchased contracts may reflect
polymerization."' The accumulation of numerous single contracts by the
seller and their subsequent transfer to the taxpayer may result in a
transformation of these contracts into a single asset, "customer struc-
ture,"82 which might be held to be nondepreciable. Because of this
Iransformation that may result by the acquisition of en masse contracts,
customer structure and its federal income tax consequences must be
examined and then compared with en masse executory sales contracts.
a. Customer Structure
Customer structure can be acquired by merger or consolidation,
stock acquisition and liquidation, purchase, issuance of stock, and develop-
ment by the taxpayer.83 A long line of cases has held that circulation
lists and customer routes constitute capital assets which have an indefinite
life.8" The same principle encompasses the development and acquisition
of customer structures consisting of utility customers, vending machine
outlets, and cleaning, medical, banking and advertising services."5
Customer structure has been characterized as a single asset distinct
81. Polymerize is defined as, "To change (by union of two or more molecules of
the same kind) into another compound having the same elements in the same propor-
tions, but a higher molecular weight and different physical properties." WEBSTER,
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1958).
82. The term "customer structure" apparently first was used in Thrifticheck Serv.
Corp., 33 T.C. 1038, 1045 (1960), aff'd, 287 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1961). See also Westing-
house Broadcasting Co., 36 T.C. 912, 917 (1961), aff'd, 309 F.2d 279 (3d Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 372 U.S. 935 (1963). The term does not appear to have a technical
meaning as used in marketing or economics. The courts have used it in reference to
assets such as customer lists, subscription lists and customer routes, and it is generally
used to denote the business relations that develop between a seller and his customers.
83. Merger or consolidation: National Weeklies, Inc. v. Commissioner, 137 F.2d
39 (8th Cir. 1943); stock acquisition and liquidation: North Am. Serv. Co., 33 T.C.
677 (1960), vacated and remanded per stipulation, 61-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 19353 (7th Cir.
1961), acq., 1960-2 Cum. BULL. 6; purchase: Anchor Cleaning Serv. Inc., 22 T.C. 1029
(1954), nonacq., 1958-1 Cum. BULL. 7; Pevely Dairy Co., 1 B.T.A. 385 (1925);
issuance of stock: Danco Prods. Inc., 21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 287 (1962); develop-
ment: Houston Natural Gas Corp. v. Commissioner, 90 F.2d 814 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 302 U.S. 722 (1937); Meredith Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 64 F.2d 890
(8th Cir. 1933), affirming sub nom. Successful Farming Publishing Co., 23 B.T.A. 150
(1931), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 646 (1933).
84. Circulation lists: Meredith Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, supra note 83;
Danville Press, Inc., 1 B.T.A. 1171 (1925) ; customer routes: Pevely Dairy Co., supra
note 83; Los Angeles Towel Serv. Co., 8 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 847 (1949).
85. Utility customer: Houston Natural Gas Corp. v. Commissioner, 90 F.2d 814
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 722 (1937); vending machine outlet: Sam Scalish,
21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 260 (1962); cleaning service: Danco Prods. Inc., 21 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 287 (1962); Anchor Cleaning Serv. Inc., 22 T.C. 1029 (1954), n1onacq.,
1958-1 Cum. BuLL 7; medical service: Richard M. Boe, 35 T.C. 720 (1961), aff'd,
307 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1962); Herbert M. La Rue, 37 T.C. 39 (1961), acq., 1962-2
Cum. BULL. 5; banking service: Thrifticheck Serv. Corp., 33 T.C. 1038 (1960), aff'd,
287 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1961); advertising service: Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 36
T.C. 912 (1961), affd, 309 F.2d 279 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 935 (1963).
from its components," and as a continuing asset which does not become
exhausted" but merely fluctuates in size and value from time to time.8"
Some courts have indicated that there is no difference between customer
structure and goodwill.8" This position appears plausible since goodwill
has also been described as a fluctuating asset that does not permanently
diminish in value through the passage of time"° and cannot be divided
into constituent parts."' Moreover, the essence of both goodwill and
customer structure is the expectation of retaining old customers. 2 Cus-
tomer structure, it has been suggested, reflects the total customer relations
of the seller and to that extent does involve goodwill.9 3 Also, it has been
described as manifesting the existence of goodwill.94 On the other hand,
some cases appear to treat customer structure as being distinct from
goodwill.9" One recent decision has explicitly held that customer structure
is not synonymous with goodwill if it is not obtained in the acquisition
of a going concern.9" If customer structure is not coupled to an intangible
which has a relation to goodwill, it is separable. 7 At any rate, from an
examination of the cases, it seems reasonable to conclude that customer
86. Thrifticheck Serv. Corp. v. Commissioner, supra note 85.
87. Herbert IN. La Rue, 37 T.C. 39, 45 (1961), acq., 1962-2 Cum. BULL. 5.
88. Danville Press, Inc., 1 B.T.A. 1171 (1925).
89. Bow v. Commissioner, 307 F.2d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1962), affirming 35 T.C.
720 (1961).
Generally, goodwill is the superior earning capacity of a business. YANG, GoODWILL
AND OTHER INTANGIBLES 87 (1927). The value that is attached to goodwill theoretic-
ally represents the present worth or capitalized value of the estimated future earnings
of a business. Id. at 88. The superior earning capacity may be the result of habitual
or preferential patronage, favorable labor relations, high credit standing or competent
managcment, id. at 87, although the factor upon which the greatest emphasis has been
placed in giving rise to goodwill is patronage. Haberle Crystal Springs Brewing Co.
v. Clarke, 30 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1929), rev'd, 280 U.S. 384 (1930) ; Note, An Inquiry
into the Nature of Goodwill, 53 COLUm. L. REV. 660, 664-70 (1953). Indeed, many
courts have appeared to treat goodwill as synonomous with patronage. See, e.g.,
Haberle Crystal Springs Brewing Co. v. Clarke, supra.
90. Note, An Inquiry into the Nature of Goodwill, supra note 89, at 725.
91. Automatic Heating and Cooling Co., 11 P-H B.T.A. Mem. 1449, 1453 (1942),
citing United States Industrial Alcohol Co. v. Helvering, 137 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1943),
re-versing on other grounds 42 B.T.A. 1323 (1940).
92. Boe v. Commissioner, 307 F.2d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1962), affirming 35 T.C. 720
(1961) ; Falstaff Beer, Inc., 37 T.C. 451, 457 (1961) ; Thrifticheck Serv. Corp., 33 T.C.
1038, 1046 (1960), af'd, 287 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1961); Pevely Dairy Co., 1 B.T.A. 385,
391 (1925) ; See generally Note, An Inquiry into the Nature of Goodwill, supra note
89, at 664-70.
93. Thrifticheck Serv. Corp., supra note 92.
94. Meredith Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 64 F.2d 890 (8th Cir. 1933),
affirming sub ntom. Successful Farming Publishing Co., 23 B.T.A. 150 (1931), cert.
denied, 290 U.S. 646 (1933).
95. Danco Prods. Inc., 21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 287, 291 (1962); Westinghouse
Broadcasting Co., 36 T.C. 912, 923 (1961), afFd, 309 F.2d 279 (3d Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 372 U.S. 935 (1963).
96. Savings Assurance Agency, Inc., 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 200 (1963).
97. Id. at 202.
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structure is essentially the same as goodwill, or is so closely related to
goodwill that it is inseparable from it if it was obtained by the taxpayer
in a business acquisition.
If it is determined that customer structure is goodwill 8 or is
inseparable from goodwill," no depreciation is allowable because it is
obtained in a business acquisition and cannot be separated from the
enterprise as a going concern.' If, on the other hand, it is decided that
customer structure exists as an asset distinct from goodwill, deprecia-
tion may still be denied because it has an indefinite useful life.' This
is the same ground that is usually advanced as the basis for denying
depreciation of goodwill.
If, however, the life of customer structure can be established with
a reasonable degree of certainty and can be severed from goodwill,
it can be depreciated. In Johnson v. United States""2 the taxpayer
purchased medical charts of patients and equipment from a retiring
gynecologist. The purchase contract provided for a $5.00 consider-
ation for each of the 5,000 charts. Because of the limited period
during which women bear children, the transient nature of the popu-
lation and the frequent change of doctors by women, the court allowed
the taxpayer to depreciate ninety percent of the contracts' cost over
a six year period. The remaining ten per cent of the cost was con-
sidered goodwill because former patients of the seller would return.
Also, in Saving Assurance Agency, Inc.,' depreciation of an expiration
list of casualty insurance policies prepared from the records of a pre-
decessor was allowed. The court indicated that no going concern was
conveyed and that the predecessor possessed no goodwill. Therefore, the
list could be depreciated over a five year period, i.e., until the last of the
policies expired. The basis of these two decisions appears to be that the
customer structure was severable from goodwill. Otherwise, it is question-
able whether depreciation should be allowed inasmuch as the assets pur-
chased were customer structure.
Another problem relating to customer structure is that a business
98. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (1956), as amended, T.D. 6452, 1960-1 Cum. BuLL.
127.
99. Automatic Heating and Cooling Co., 11 P-H B.T.A. Mem. 1449, 1453 (1942),
citing United States Industrial Alcohol Co. v. Helvering, 137 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1943),
reversing on other grounds 42 B.T.A. 1323 (1940).
100. Boe v. Commissioner, 307 F.2d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1962), affirming 35 T.C.
720 (1961) ; Savings Assurance Agency, Inc., 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 200 (1963).
101. Boe v. Commissioner, supra note 100. Danco Prods. Inc., 21 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 287, 291 (1962) ; Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 36 T.C. 912 (1961), af Id, 309
F.2d 279 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 935 (1963).
102. 61-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9278 (W.D. Tex. 1961).
103. 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 200 (1963).
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loss deduction may be denied when patrons are lost.1" ' Courts have held
that the loss of an individual account does not destroy a portion of
customer structure but merely temporarily reduces its total value." 5
Courts in these cases appear to have classified customer structure as
goodwill and to have denied a deduction because of an absence of a
completed and closed transaction. Before any deduction is allowable,
the entire customer structure or goodwill must be disposed of or lost.1"0
A mere fluctuation in the value of an asset or a partial loss of goodwill
does not give rise to a loss.'
Courts have justified their denial of depreciation and loss deductions
upon the general ground that a taxpayer is permitted to deduct the cost
of maintaining the customer structure as an ordinary and necessary busi-
ness expense.0 8 This deduction substitutes for depreciation and business
loss deductions,' and the practice avoids the problems of deducting the
cost of lost accounts and capitalizing expenditures incurred in acquiring
new accounts. The preference for the single deduction exists because
it provides for a simple and expedient execution of tax audits by
enabling a time consuming, detailed analysis of the taxpayer's marketing
expenditures to be avoided."0 The ultimate consequence is that the
burden of courts is reduced because they do not have to determine
whether a particular account had been lost and whether a particular
expenditure contributed to the acquisition of a new customer and there-
fore should be treated as a capital expenditure.
But while expediency is served by permitting expenditures relating
104. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 165.
105. Danco Prods. Inc., 21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 287, 291 (1962); Thrifticheck
Serv. Corp., 33 T.C. 1038, 1047 (1960), afj'd, 287 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1961); Anchor
Cleaning Serv. Inc., 22 T.C. 1029, 1035 (1954), nonacq., 1958-1 Cum. BULL. 7.
106. Anchor Cleaning Serv. Inc., supra note 105.
107. New York Sun, Inc., 27 T.C. 319 (1956), aff'd per curiam, 253 F.2d 487 (2d
Cir. 1958); Reporter Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 201 F.2d 743 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 345 U.S. 993 (1953).
108. Houston Natural Gas Corp. v. Commissioner, 90 F.2d 814 (4th Cir.), cert.
dcnicd, 302 U.S. 722 (1937); Meredith Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 64 F.2d 890(8th Cir. 1933), affirming sub norn. Successful Farming Publishing Co., 23 B.T.A. 150
(1931), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 646 (1933).
109. Meredith Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, supra note 108.
110. Probably, the expenditure which relates most closely to the development of
customer structure is advertising. To closely scrutinize the advertising expenditures of
a taxpayer to determine whether any customer structure should be capitalized, while
deductions were permitted for lost customers, would require an extensive examination.
For example, for the year ended June, 1960, 1,074,128 corporate tax returns were filed
which reported *8,746,442,000 as advertising deductions. INT. Rzv. SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF
THE TREAS., Preliminary Report, Statistics of Income-1959-60, Corporation Income
Tax Returns 16 (1961). For the year ended June, 1961, 1,140,574 corporate tax re-
turns were filed which reported $9,290,759,000 as advertising deductions. INT. REv.
SERV., U.S. DEPT OF THE TREAS., Statistics of Income--1960-61, Corporation Income
Tax Returns 52 (1963).
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to the acquisition of new customers after the basic customer structure
is once established to be deducted as an ordinary and necessary business
expense, a taxpayer cannot avoid the problems of non-depreciation of
present accounts and non-deductibility of lost accounts by developing an
entirely new customer structure. The courts have denied a deduction
as an ordinary and necessary business expense where extensive expendi-
tures have been incurred in developing a new line or expending the
market for existing products."' So long as the expenditures approxi-
mately maintain an established number of accounts, a deduction is al-
lowed. If a disproportionate number of new accounts are acquired, how-
ever, the expenditures must be capitalized.
b. En Masse Contracts
The customer structure acquired in the early cases consisted of
subscription lists"2 and customer routes."' The purchase of these assets
merely reflected the probability or the purchaser's expectation of retain-
ing the seller's old customers. None of the rights assigned obligated the
customers to deal with the taxpayers. However, where en masse con-
tracts are purchased, the taxpayer acquires enforceable rights against the
customer. It would therefore seem to follow, by orthodox doctrines of
depreciation, that the rights acquired should be limited to the contract
term and depreciated over that period. However, courts have rejected
this contention when advanced by taxpayers and have held that the en
masse contracts constitute customer structure."4 Although these cases
have been severly criticized as deviating from general principles of con-
tract depreciation," 5 en masse contracts and customer structure have
characteristics somewhat in common which justify similar tax treatment.
The question, therefore, is whether the similarities of customer structure
and en masse contracts are so great and their differences so insignificant
111. Houston Natural Gas Corp. v. Commissioner, 90 F.2d 814 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 302 U.S. 722 (1937); Meredith Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 64 F.2d 890(8th Cir. 1933), affirming sub nor. Successful Farming Publishing Co., 23 B.T.A. 150(1931), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 646 (1933).
112. Public Opinion Publishing Co., 6 B.T.A. 1255 (1927); Walter S. Dickey, 14
B.T.A. 1295 (1929).
113. Pevely Dairy Co., 1 B.T.A. 385 (1925).
114. Danco Prods. Inc., 21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 287 (1962); Sam Scalish, 21
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 260 (1962); Richard M. Boe, 35 T.C. 720 (1961), aff'd, 307 F.2d
339 (9th Cir. 1962) ; Herbert M. LaRue, 37 T.C. 39 (1961), acq., 1962-2 Cums. BULL.
5; Thrifticheck Serv. Corp., 33 T.C. 1038 (1960), aff'd, 287 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1961);
Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 36 T.C. 912 (1961), aff'd, 309 F.2d 279 (3d Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 372 U.S. 935 (1963).
115. Alexander, Vahation of Intangibles, N.Y.U. 20th Inst. on Fed. Tax 567, 583(1962) ; McDonald, Goodwill and the Federal Income Tax, 45 VA. L. REv. 645, 675
n.81 (1959).
NOTES
that, in general, no allowance for depreciation should be granted in either
case. Such an inquiry follows.
1. Benefits Anticipated
In United States Industrial Alcohol Co. v. Helverhig 116 Learned
Hand stated that the only inducements to the purchase of an executory
sales contract are the expectation of either an exceptional profit or a cost
savings. This statement implies that contract purchases are usually made
for the profit element and allows the inference that if neither of the
profit associated inducements are present other benefits must have been
anticipated. Therefore, where profit is not the sole inducement, attention
must be addressed to the benefits which the taxpayer anticipated from
the contracts and to how these benefits relate to customer structure.
Possible benefits that may be acquired are those that result from the
executory portions of the contracts, the exercise of a renewal provision,
customer contact for acquiring further business, and maintenance of an
established business organization.""
a. Customer Contact
It has been noted that the early customer structure cases did not
involve contracts which were executory in whole or in part. However,
the mere fact that a contract is purchased does not conclusively establish
that depreciable rights are acquired. The document which embraces the
individual contract may only serve as a starting point for determining
the relationship between the contracting parties. The binding obligation
may be softened and modified by custom, usage, practices and informal
understandings within a trade or industry. The principles of contract
law, while acceptable to the courts for purposes of contract enforcement,
may be divorced from the practicalities of a trade or industry and the
significance that the parties attach to them. As a result, the particular
trade must be examined to determine the benefit anticipated, which
determination will be based upon an estimate of the contract's enforce-
ability. For example, one case in which an analysis of sales contracts
within the alcohol industry was made demonstrated that the industry
did not consider the contracts binding, although on their face they were,
and that therefore acquisition did not give rise to a depreciable asset."' 8
116. 137 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1943), reversing 42 B.T.A. 1323 (1940).
117. Thrifticheck Serv. Corp. v. Commissioner, 287 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1961),
affirming 33 T.C. 1038 (1960).
118. United States Industrial Alcohol Co. v. Helvering, 137 F.2d 511 (2d Cir.
1943), reversing on other grounds 42 B.T.A. 1323 (1940).
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It is obvious that comparable practices are carried on in other trades.11
Under such circumstances, the taxpayer is not anticipating benefits be-
cause of the enforceability of the contract, but from the customer contact
that ownership of the contract will generate. Therefore, the total benefits
acquired are the same as the benefit involved in the purchase of customer
structure-the probability or expectation of retaining old customers.
Where the contracts are fully enforceable, on the other hand, the
taxpayer acquires benefits under their executory portions as well as the
additional benefits at their expiration of being in a favorable bargaining
position with the customers for further business because of the customer
contact had during the executory periods.' If the promisor is satisfied
with the performance of the taxpayer, competitors will have to more than
meet the terms of the taxpayer's offer to acquire the customer's busi-
ness because of the taxpayer's previously demonstrated dependability
and experience. Where the cost of the en masse contracts greatly ex-
ceeds the profit that may be derived during their executory terms, the
taxpayer must have purchased not only the profits that can be realized
during that term, but also the benefit of continued customer relations
with the promisors. Were this benefit separated from the executory
portion of the en masse contracts, it would be comparable to the non-
binding aspects of doing further business which is the hallmark of
customer structure.
If there are automatic renewal provisions in the en masse contracts,
naturally there is difficulty in accurately determining the useful life of
each individual contract. Indeed, the presence of renewal provisions is
an indicia of customer structure since they place the taxpayer in a position
where he can possibly gain further business from the customer.'21 This
is essentially the same as situations in which the taxpayer enters new
contracts based upon the business relations created during the life of
previous contracts. The tendency of the prior parties to exercise the
renewal provisions is an indication that the contract was purchased, at
least in part, for the purpose of establishing customer contact. 2 Similar
benefits may be acquired where premature cancellation provisions are
119. See Schultz, The Firm Offer Puzzle: A Study of Business Practice in the
Construction Industry, 19 U. Cmi. L. REv. 237 (1952); Note, Private Lawmaking by
Trade Associations, 62 HARV. L. REv. 1346 (1949).
120. Thrifticheck Serv. Corp. v. Commissioner, 287 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1961),
affirming 33 T.C. 1038 (1960).
121. Ibid.
122. Boe v. Commissioner, 307 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1962), affirming 35 T.C. 720(1961); Thrifticheck Serv. Corp., 33 T.C. 1038, 1046 (1960), affd, 287 F.2d 1 (2d
Cir. 1961).
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included in the contracts."2 3 The favorable relations created during the
non-terminable period of the contracts obviates the likelihood that the
customer will terminate the relationship.
Thus, if by trade usage the contract is not enforceable, if continued
relations are expected, if automatic renewal provisions are present or if
premature cancellation provisions are contained in the contract, there is
a strong likelihood that at least part of the consideration paid for the
contract is properly attributable to customer structure and is not de-
preciable.
b. Adhesion.
Another element which must be considered in analyzing the'relation-
ship of en masse contracts and structure is adhesion. The elements which
constitute customer structure do not obligate the customer to deal with the
taxpayer, and any business between the two is voluntary in nature and
based upon past favorable business relations. However, the terms of
acquired en masse contracts may embody features which tie the con-
tractors to future contracts in a somewhat coercive manner; future busi-
ness may not depend entirely upon past, favorable business relations or
upon normal profit. Incidental benefits received during the contract
periods or economic disadvantages in not entering future agreements
may prevent the promisors from freely severing relations with the tax-
payer.
The adhesive element can exist, for example, where the contracts
provide for the installation of the seller's equipment for use in the
marketing of the taxpayer's products and the buyer's other products and
services, e.g., service station equipment and pumps, food displays and
storage equipment in a grocery store, and refrigerators and dispensing
equipment in a tavern. If the buyers were to terminate business relations
with the taxpayer at the end of the original term of the contracts, they
would then be required to furnish their own equipment or seek another
seller who would install the necessary equipment pursuant to a supply
contract. Even if the buyers find other sellers, normal business opera-
tions would be interrupted during the period that the change of equip-
ment is made. If the buyer purchases and installs the necessary equip-
ment, a termination of business relations can impose a substantial finan-
cial burden in addition to the disruption of business. The cost of the
equipment could deplete his cash reserves to the point of interfering
with normal business activities. Thus, the alternatives open to the cus-
123. Thrifficheck Serv. Corp. v. Commissioner, supra note 122.
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tomers can be sufficiently detrimental that the customers are economically
required to continue dealing with the taxpayer.
Additionally, a promisor can suffer direct economic loss by dis-
continuing dealing with the taxpayer because of the contract provisions
used in certain industries. In the life insurance and mutual fund in-
dustries, for example, the previously referred to "front-load" charges
deter a policy-owner or investor from discontinuing the relationship once
it is commenced. If the customers terminate the arrangement and seek
another contractor, they must surrender their initial investment, which
satisfied the carrying charges, and incur the same initial costs with the
new contractor. The natural desire to avoid duplicating these costs is an
adhesive factor which tends to induce customers to continue dealing
with the taxpayer.
If adhesive features are present, the taxpayer may be willing to pay
a greater price for the seller's contracts than he otherwise would have
offered, a clear indication that he anticipates benefits other than those
that will arise under the executory portions of the contracts. In such a
situation there is sufficient reason to hold that the total cost of the en
masse contracts cannot be amortized over the contract terms since in-
definite, future tax periods are benefited by ownership of the contracts.
c. Continuity of Operations
Another benefit acquired in a purchase of en masse contracts is
continuity of established business operations." 4 As stated above, the
acquisition of en masse contracts generally accompanies the purchase
of a going concern. The contracts are ancillary to the tangible business
properties purchased and provide a guaranteed market for the products
or services of the taxpayer immediately following the purchase. The
ability to sell during this critical period insures the taxpayer against a
break in operations and reduces the possibility of an initial loss, the
problem that so frequently vexes the launching of a new enterprise. This
ability to sell also eliminates the necessity of the taxpayer's developing
a basic customer structure and permits him to devote his primary efforts
to seeking additional business. The combination of these benefits places
the taxpayer at the helm of a concern operating at near full or even full
capacity with all the related efficiencies.
The benefit of business continuity has a value independent of any
profit element and exists for an indefinite period beyond the expiration
of the purchased contracts. While continuity of operations does not
124. United States Industrial Alcohol Co. v. -elvering, 137 F.2d 511 (2d Cir.
1943), reversing on other grounds 42 B.T.A. 1323 (1940).
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appear to constitute customer structure inasmuch as it is based upon the
legal enforceability of contracts rather than upon the probability or
expectation of retaining old customers, there is nevertheless a relationship
between the two. The same contracts which give rise to continuity of
operations also produce the customer contact during the executory period
of the contracts that is the basis of customer structure. As a result, an
attempt to depreciate the total costs of the contracts can be attacked both
on the ground that they produce continuity of operations and that they
give rise to customer structure.
d. Purchased Profit
While there are significant similarities which link en masse con-
tracts and customer structure, a benefit that is unique to en masse
contracts is the expectation of a profit from the executory portion of the
contracts. When a purchaser acquires customer structure he merely
has the expectation of future profitable transactions. lEn masse con-
tracts, on the other hand, give rise to a profit during their enforceable
terms which is a benefit in addition to the expected future transactions.
In the earliest of the en masse contract cases, Danville Press,"' the
Board of Tax Appeals held that 9,000 unexpired newspaper subscriptions
constituted customer structure. The Board's opinion did not mention
the possible profit element which could have existed in the contracts.
Subsequent decisons merely cited this case and held that en masse con-
tracts represented customer structure without analyzing the compon-
ents. -  As a result, the total cost of contracts was treated as non-
depreciable. If the profit element is considered it seems that the Danville
principle is too broad and that amortization should be allowed as to this
portion of contract cost.
Where en masse contracts are purchased it is apparent that the
seller intended to gain the profits, if any, that would result during the
enforceable term of the contracts. This is indicated by the sale of the
contracts to the taxpayer. Executory contracts represent unrealized in-
come in the hands of a seller and, when sold, that income is reduced to
cash. Under such circumstances a portion of the consideration paid by
the taxpayer represents what formerly was the seller's anticipated profit,
based upon its present money value. The seller in effect discounts his
125. 1 B.T.A. 1171 (1925).
126. Meredith Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 64 F.2d 890 (8th Cir. 1933),
affirming sub noam. Successful Farming Publishing Co., 23 B.T.A. 150 (1931), cert.
denicd, 290 U.S. 646 (1933); Sam Scalish, 21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 260 (1962);
Richard Mf. Boe, 35 T.C. 720 (1961), aff'd, 307 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1962) ; Thrifticheck
Serv. Corp., 33 T.C. 1038 (1960), afr'd, 287 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1961); Anchor Cleaning
Serv. Inc., 22 T.C. 1029 (1954), nonacq., 1958-1 Cum. BULL. 7.
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rights to future profit which becomes absolute upon performance. Subse-
quently, the taxpayer realizes income on that portion of the transaction
when the profits are realized to the extent that collected profits exceed
paid profit.
The portion of the consideration that reflects future profit repre-
sents an asset distinct from the other anticipated benefits acquired from
the seller. It is in the nature of a deferred expense to the purchaser and
should be amortizable over the lives of the enforceable parts of the
contracts or in proportion to the gross receipts anticipated under the
contracts. It is not customer structure because no future benefits are
anticipated from it. Nor does it constitute or relate to continuity of
operations because the profit element does not give rise to the continued
operations. Continuity is synonymous with performance and production,
while profit is its result. The benefit of continuity of operations therefore
must result from the part of the consideration that is not applicable to
profit.
Nor does the profit element purchased reflect the normal profit
rate for the trade or industry. It is, instead, similar to the purchase of
terminable interests such as insurance renewal commissions 2 and life
estates, 2 ' where there exists a limited life based upon the income that is
to be received. As the performance of the contracts is made and the
gross receipts are collected pursuant to the terms of the contracts, cost
of performance is recovered and contract profit is realized. The profit
from operations is composed of the discounted profit paid to the seller
and the income resulting from discounting the anticipated profit of the
seller. This income more closely represents the rate of return customary
to financial institutions than the profit rate in the trade of the taxpayer.
Where the contracts provide in their terms for a definite total of
gross receipts, it is possible to determine the amount of contract profit
by the indexes of industry average or past experience. The anticipated
cost of performance can be determined with reasonable certainty where
this information is available. However, where anticipated gross receipts
is variable because, for example, the contracts cover requirements and
the volume of business is uncertain, it is questionable whether the profit
can be depreciated, assuming someone would purchase such a speculative
asset. There would be no reasonably accurate basis for determining total
receipts. In such a situation it is questionable whether the seller is dispos-
ing of vested rights to profit or a mere expectation of profit. While
127. Francis E. Latendresse, 26 T.C. 318 (1956), affd, 243 F.2d 577 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 830 (1957), acq., 1957-1 Cum. BuLL. 3 (1926).
128. Bell v. Harrison, 212 F.2d 253 (7th Cir. 1954).
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there would be a transfer of enforceable rights, their value would be in
the nature of the value of customer structure.
There may, however, be problems encountered in depreciating even
an ascertainable profit element. When multiple assets are acquired, the
total purchase price generally must be allocated among individual assets.
If the profit element constitutes a distinct asset, a portion of the consider-
ation should be allocated to it by the taxpayer and depreciated. However,
it has been held that customer structure cannot be separated from good-
will and therefore cannot be depreciated. 9 This may lead to the infer-
ence that, in a similar manner, the profit element cannot be segregated
from the customer structure for the purpose of depreciation because of
the latter's close resemblance to goodwill.' Nevertheless, as the prior
discussion indicates, the profit element may actually be distinct from
customer structure and goodwill. To insure that a cost basis is acquired
for depreciation purposes an allocation to the profit element should be
included in the purchase agreement.'
If customer structure and goodwill are considered identical there is
an argument for denying depreciation of the profit element which is
based upon traditional property concepts. The sale of goodwill has been
recognized as the transfer of the present worth of estimated future
business earnings. 2 In Hort v. Commissioner' the taxpayer was the
devisee of realty subject to a lease. The taxpayer and the lessee agreed
to terminate the arrangement upon payment of a cancellation fee. When
reporting the cancellation fee the taxpayer contended that he had received
two separate capital assets, i.e., the lease and the remainder, and that
the present value of the lease could be offset against the cancellation fee.
The court rejected this contention, and the case may be controlling with
regard to the depreciation of the profit element. To separate the profit
element from goodwill would be, in essence, to sever a portion of profit
from the total estimated future profits of the business and offset it
against current income. This practice would be analogous to what was
attempted in the Hort case since the taxpayer there attempted to separate
the present value of the term of years from the fee and offset it against
the cancellation fee. Both situations may require that depreciation of the
profit element be denied.
129. Automatic Heating and Cooling Co., 11 P-H B.T.A. Mem. 1449, 1453 (1942),
citing United States Industrial Alcohol Co. v. Helvering, 137 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1943),
reversing on other grounds 42 B.T.A. 1323 (1940).
130. Thrifticheck Serv. Corp. v. Commissioner, 287 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1961), affirming
33 T.C. 1038 (1960).
131. Ibid.
132. YANG, GOODWILL AND OTHER INTANGIBLES 88 (1927).
133. 313 U.S. 28 (1941).
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e. Cost Savings
Another portion of the purchase price may be depreciable where the
seller has incurred costs either in securing the executory contracts or in
partially performing them. A cost saving results to the purchaser be-
cause those costs of securing and partially performing the contracts
which were absorbed by the seller would otherwise have been incurred
by the taxpayer. The portion of the consideration that is applicable to
the cost savings is in substance a deferred charge that benefits the profit
produced during the executory portion of the contract and should be
depreciated over the lives of the contracts. It was suggested in United
States Industrial Alcohol' that the taxpayer could depreciate a portion
of the consideration that would otherwise have been necessary to initially
acquire equivalent contracts.
One problem that necessarily arises in an attempt to depreciate the
cost savings is determining the basis to be used for computing the allow-
able deduction. It is suggested that the basis should not only include
the expenditures of the seller but that it should also reflect an element
of interest based upon the going rate for the cost of capital. It would
seem reasonable that the taxpayer should reimburse the seller both for
the expenditures at cost and for the use of the latter's funds in financing
the cash outlay. This reimbursement should be based upon the going
interest rate. Another approach that may be taken is to base the amount
to be depreciated upon the cost that the taxpayer would have incurred
had he initially entered the contracts. Of course a basis determined by
this approach may differ significantly from cost plus interest because
the parties may not have the same volume of business, work force or
reputation. This would require a more detailed analysis than the use of
cost plus interest, so expediency may require that the cost method be used.
There may, however, be shortcomings in an attempt to depreciate
this portion of the total consideration paid for the contracts. The affect
of the prior costs on the profit element must be considered. Since the
seller incurred these costs they must enter into the determination of his
anticipated profit. If it is permissible to depreciate the profit element in
the contracts the depreciation of the cost savings should not also be
134. 137 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1943), reversing 42 B.T.A. 1323 (1940).
Note that the argument in support of depreciation of the prior cost of production
based on company experience may be used to fortify the argument for depreciation of
the profit element. The purchase of the profit element is comparable to the purchase
of previously incurred costs which benefits the income gained during the executory
periods of the contracts because it aids in the production of profit. While the prior
costs benefit the contract profit, the expenditure for the profit of the seller produces
income based upon the discounted profit. Both expenditures are basically deferrals and
aid in the production of income.
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allowed. To permit both would result in a double deduction. Therefore,
it is suggested that the cost savings can only be depreciated if it is used
as an alternative to depreciation of the profit element.
Another problem would arise should the depreciation of cost savings
be held inconsistent with the doctrine of continued operations. The two
may be incompatible because continued operations is based upon avoid-
ance of business interruption and the portion of the consideration that is
applicable to cost savings aids the completion of the contracts. The aid
the taxpayer receives in completing the contracts places him in a better
position to perform the contract and avoid interruption. In fact, it is
questionable whether the benefits of cost savings can in actual practice
be segregated or distinguished from continued operations. If such should
be the case, depreciation of the portion of consideration applicable to cost
savings would be disallowed.
B. Losses
In considering the termination of individual contracts within the
en masse purchase, courts have generally treated the contracts as the
equivalent of customer structure and have consequently disallowed a
business loss deduction. The termination of an individual contract does
not affect the make-up of the customer structure but merely temporarily
reduces its value. Therefore, to be entitled to a loss deduction the entire
asset must be disposed of in a completed and closed transaction just as in
those cases involving goodwill.
C. Distinctions
A final problem which faces the taxpayer who attempts to depreciate
the cost of acquiring contracts is the difficulty of drawing a distinction
between the acquisition of a single contract and the acquisition of en
masse contracts. In Indiana Broadcasting ... the Commissioner con-
tended that the two network affiliation contracts assured the taxpayer
the opportunity of securing substantial revenues from the sponsors of
the network programs and thus constituted customer structure or good-
will. Under the contracts the network and the taxpayer shared adver-
tising revenue from the network programs, and the Commissioner
appears to have argued that the sponsors of the network programs con-
stituted a customer structure of the taxpayer. The court rejected this
contention and distinguished that situation from where en masse contracts
are acquired and depreciated. The court indicated that a single contract
is wholly unlike en masse contracts because continued receipts under
135. 41 T.C. no.76 (1964).
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the former depend solely upon the decision of the network to continue
or to terminate the contract. On the other hand, en masse contracts are
in a constant state of flux since individual contracts continuously expire
and new ones are solicited and acquired, and the actions of a single
customer are somewhat insignificant.
The decision, however, appears to leave some doubt as to how to
distinguish between the two classes of contracts. Approximately seventy-
four per cent of the taxpayer's income in Indiana Broadcasting came
from other sources and the court appears to have emphasized this point.
If, in a future case, the bulk of the taxpayer's income is derived from a
few executory contracts the contention of the Commissioner may be
sustained,"8' but the same reasoning of the court in Indiana Broadcasting
could be employed in such a situation. The continued relationship between
the taxpayer and buyer would depend upon the consent of the buyer.
The taxpayer would have no control over the market for his products
or services if the relationship was based upon an exclusive arrangement.
The taxpayer, being a captive seller, would be tied to the economic
activities of the buyer."' It is questionable whether the taxpayer would
have sufficient freedom to have acquired a customer structure. Also,
where only a few contracts exist, the necessary goodwill that is inherent
in customer structure is missing because of the lack of contact with the
general consuming public.
136. None of the cases have discussed the number of contracts it requires to con-
stitute en masse contracts. However, in Nicholas Co., 38 T.C. 348 (1962), the court,
in denying as an ordinary and necessary business expense the expenditures for four
executory contracts, cited the customer structure cases. Id. at 356. No indication was
given of the total number of contracts possessed by the seller and whether it constituted
the total customer structure of the seller. The case does not answer the question
adequately since it merely concerned ordinary and necessary business expense and not
depreciation or loss deductions. However, this case may indicate that the transfer of
only a few contracts may constitute customer structure.
137. For example, in the radio and television industry the local stations have only
recently been able to refuse to accept network programing. The Federal Communica-
tions Commission has established regulations which prohibit networks from obtaining
an option on the broadcast time of a station. Fed. Reg. 5512 (1963), amending 47
C.F.R. § 3.658(d) (1958). For a background on the regulation see Fed. Reg. 5501-
5512 (1963); Klieg, Lights Turn on TV Nets, Bus. Week, Oct. 12, 1954, p. 113. The
regulation states that "no license shall be granted... ," and indicates that the license
will not be renewed when it expires if a violation is discovered. 47 C.F.R. § 1.328
(1958); 47 C.F.R. § 1.361 (Supp. 1963). In addition, it has been only recently that
local stations have been able to refuse to accept network sponsors able to select the
local stations to carry network advertisements. American Mfgs. Mut. Ins. Co. v.
American Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres, Inc., 221 F. Supp. 848 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
But see American Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres, Inc. v. American Mfgs. Mut.
Ins. Co., CCH 1963 Trade Cases 170882 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1963). Contra Columbia
Broadcasting System v. Amana, 295 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S.




The foregoing discussion has emphasized the myriad problems that
can plague a taxpayer who purchases executory contracts. If single
contracts are acquired, depreciation will be permitted only if the life of
the contract can be established with reasonable certainty. If en masse
contracts are acquired, depreciation will probably be denied in full. It
has been suggested above that the tax treatment accorded en masse con-
tracts may be inconsistent with recognized principles of depreciation,
and therefore should be given careful reconsideration. It remains to be
considered whether the attitude of the courts and the Commissioner
toward the depreciation of contracts might not be seriously out of har-
mony with Congressional policy.
During the past decade Congress has taken numerous steps to ease
the economic burden of acquiring tangible assets. In 1954 the Internal
Revenue Code expanded the permissible methods of depreciation from
straight line to include the double-declining balance and sum of the years-
digits methods, 3' both allowing accelerated depreciation during the early
life of an asset. Also, the Small Business Tax Revision Act of 1958
provided for additional depreciation of tangible assets during the first
year of their acquisition.' In 1962 the investment credit was enacted
which permits a taxpayer to reduce his tax liability based upon tangible
assets purchased. 4 And finally, the Commissioner has promulgated
Revenue Procedure 62-21 which establishes "guidelines" that enable tax-
payers to obtain greater depreciation based upon obsolescence.'
These statutes and the revenue ruling indicate that there is a trend
toward lossening past restrictions on depreciation. It is suggested that
the treatment accorded en masse contracts may be inconsistent with this
trend. When a taxpayer acquires a business he is able to depreciate
tangible assets rapidly, but intangible assets which are a normal incident
to his acquisition, such as en masse contracts, are generally denied
depreciation.
The present tax treatment accorded en masse contracts may also
produce some undesirable, inconsistent consequences between large and
small businesses. When a large firm develops a new line of merchandise
or service it may be able to conceal expansion costs by burying them in
current marketing expenses. On the other hand, small businesses may 4-t
138. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 167(b).
139. INT. REV. CODE Or 1954, § 179.
140. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 38, 46-48, 181, discussed in Goldstein, Develop-
ients in Tax Depreciation and Related Areas, 49 VA. L. REv. 411 (1963).
141. 1962-2 Cum. BULL. 418, discussed in Harney, Experience with the Deprecia-
tion Guidelines, 42 TAXES 127 (1964), and Goldstein, supra note 140.
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have either the staff or marketing facilities to duplicate the pattern
followed by large organizations and therefore may be required to pur-
chase their customer structure. This situation is analogous to the in-
equities which existed in regard to research and development expenses
before enactment of the 1954 Code. Generally, such expenditures were
held not deductible.142 However, large concerns were able to charge off
the cost of research and development by establishing a separate research
organization,14 while small businesses which could afford neither the
necessary facilities nor staff were required to contract-out research and
capitalize its cost. 44 Congress recognized the restrictive nature of this
treatment on small business.'45 To equalize the two situations so as to
help small, pioneering businesses and to encourage research and experi-
mental activity, 4 ' Congress passed legislation which permitted taxpayers
to deduct research and experimental expenditures currently. 47 Similar
legislation may be wise in the purchased contracts area.
The treatment of en masse contracts or customer structure may
also be inconsistent with antitrust law and policy. The denial of deprecia-
tion allowances for executory contracts may work against the wishes of
Congress to secure effective competition. If the owner of a small busi-
ness attempts to sell his concern to someone other than a large business,
the tax treatment likely to be accorded en masse contracts or customer
structure may be a crucial factor in a would-be purchaser's determination
whether or not to enter the sale. Depreciation of these assets is relevant
because, if allowed, the necessary working capital could be generated to
cover the repayment of the money borrowed to finance the acquisition
as well as to replace needed machinery and equipment. Small firms have
limited access to the capital markets to secure debt -financing,"" and a
disallowance of depreciation makes such financing even more difficult.'49
142. Hart-Bartlett-Sturtevant Grain Co. v. Commissioner, 182 F.2d 153 (8th Cir.
1950); J. R. Clem, 10 CCH Tax Ct. Mer. 1248 (1951).
The taxpayer and Commissioner argued deductibility and non-deductibility depending
upon whether the taxpayer had a taxable profit or loss. Compare Lanova Corp., 17 T.C.
1178 (1952) and American Seating Co., 4 B.T.A. 649 (1926), with Homer L. Strong,
14 B.T.A. 902 (1928).
143. Rice, Research and Development Costs, 25 TAxEs 41, 42 (1947).
144. Harney, supra note 141, at 152.
145. Hearings Before Senate Finance Committee on H.R. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d
Sess., pt. 1, at 105 (1954).
146. Ibid.
147. INT. REv. CODE oF 1954, § 174; Alexander, Research and Experimental Ex-
penditure Under the 1954 Code, 10 TAx L. REv. 549 (1955).
148. Schmidt, The Correlation of Federal Taxation of Small Business and Anti-
trust Policy, 39 U. DET. L.J. 181, 192 (1961).
149. For example, in Thrifticheck Service Corporation, 33 T.C. 1038 (1960),
afj'd, 287 F.2d I (2d Cir. 1961), the employees of the former owner purchased the
firm's assets, including the en masse contracts, and agreed to pay the owner in monthly
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The inevitable result of a deduction disallowance is that large concerns
with excess working capital have the greatest ability to purchase"0 and
business ownership therefore becomes more and more concentrated.
These consequences appear inconsistent with recent legislation.'
Ultimately, the goals of both the antitrust and tax laws should be
examined and steps taken to correlate respective policies. This may re-
quire that the entire tax structure be revamped. However, as an im-
mediate step, the tax treatment of en masse contracts, customer structure
and goodwill could be revised to aid small business and foster that free
and open competition which is the cornerstone of our economy.
EXCLUSIVE TERRITORIAL ARRANGEMENTS
AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS
On October 31, 1963, the Department of Justice filed a civil anti-
trust suit against the Studebaker Corporation of South Bend, Indiana,'
seeking to end Studebaker's allegedly illegal methods of distributing
the motor-oil additive "STP." The complaint asserted that Studebaker
fixed the prices at which its distributors could sell the additive to jobbers,
jobbers could sell to retailers, and retailers could sell to the public, thereby
violating section 1 of the Sherman Act.' Studebaker, it was charged, also
allocated territories within which its distributors could sell, and prevented
them from selling outside of those territories. The Studebaker case is one
of several recent instances in which "territorial security" has come under
fire from the Government.
The term "territorial security" refers to arrangements under which a
wholesaler or retailer agrees not to sell outside of a specified geographical
area, or not to sell to customers who reside or have their places of
business outside of that area.' Closely related to territorial security is the
installments covering a six year period. The decision of the court to disallow deprecia-
tion undoubtedly worked a hardship on the taxpayer in meeting the necessary install-
ments. That decision tends to reduce the incentive of acquiring a small business where
the taxpayer has limited funds and resources.
150. Large firms acquired surpluses of working capital because of substantial de-
preciation charges and accumulation of profits during periods when tax rates were
lower. MASSEL, COrPEITION AND MONOPOLY 74 (1962).
151. See generally Schmidt, supra note 148.
1. United States v. Studebaker Corp., 5 TAD REG. RE,. 1 45063 (D. Neb. Oct.
31, 1963).
2. 26 Stat. 109 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958) : "Every contract, combi-
nation in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade of commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. .. ."
3. The terminology relating to such arrangements is by no means uniform. Such
